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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a condemnation by the Utah
State Road Commission to acquire certain real property
in Sevier County for the purpose of constructing a
highway connecting the city of Salina to the 1-70
freeway.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on the issue of amount
of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After
trial, the state made a motion for a new trial which
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was denied by the District Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Utah State Road Commission, plaintiffappellant in the action, seeks a reversal of the court's
denial together with an order that the case be remanded
for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
By this action in eminent domain the State
of Utah sought to acquire 3.21 acres in fee from a
tract belonging to defendants consisting of 6.96
acres.

The taking divided the tract into two portions

with 0.96 acres remaining on the east side of the new
highway and 2.79 acres on the west.

In addition,

there was a limited access line established along the
boundary of the taking.

Defendants, by this limited

access line, were denied access to the 0.96 acres
remaining east of the highway.

A map illustrating

the property and the taking is included at the end of
this brief as a reference for the convenience of the
court.
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At trial on June 12 and 13, 1975, the range
of testimony as to the just compensation to be paid
was presented as follows:
Mr. Harry Dyson for the State (T. 135,
138, 163):
Land and improvements taken
Damages to remaining land and
improvements
TOTAL

$ 9,699
22,532
$32,228

Mr. Alden Adams for the State (T. 190,
193, 194):
Land taken
Damages to remaining land
Improvements taken and damages
to remaining improvements
TOTAL

$ 8,025
2,834
31,196
$42,055

Mr. Memory Cain for the condemnees (T.
96-97):
Land taken
$ 8,025
Damages to remaining land
2,610
Improvements taken
4,387
Damages to remaining improvements 47,960
TOTAL
$63,000
Mr. Earl Sampson, the landowner (T. 43-48):
Land taken (3.21 acres at
$5,000/acre)
Damages to remaining land
Improvements taken and damages
to remaining improvements
TOTAL

$16,050
5,800
60,000
$81,850
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The jury returned a verdict of $16,050 for
"market value of property taken by the State" and
$46,950 for "damages, if any, to remaining land and
improvements by reason of severance."

This made a

total just compensation, as determined by the jury, of
$63,000.

ARGUMENT
THE PORTION OF THE VERDICT CONCERNING VALUE
OF PROPERTY TAKEN WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO THE
CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD
BE REVERSED.
Several expert witnesses submitted their
opinions at trial as to the value of the subject
property.

The highest of such expert testimony was given

by Mr. Memory Cain who was called by the defendants.
He testified that defendants should be awarded a
total of $63,000 as just compensation in the case.
Mr. Cain broke this total figure into $12,412 for
land and improvements taken and $50f570 for damages
-

to land and improvements which were not taken.
(T. 96-97) .
The jury awarded a total of $63,000 which is
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the same as the amount testified to by Mr. Cain.
The breakdown arrived at by the jury between value of
taking and severance damages is# however, different
than the expert testimony.

The verdict on amount of

severance damages was $46,950. This is within the
range of the expert valuation testimony submitted at
trial and that portion of the verdict is not challenged
by appellant.
The jury verdict for property taken was
$16,050.

This is $3,638 in excess of the high expert

testimony as to value of property taken. Because there
is no expert testimony to support this portion of the
verdict (the testimony of the state's appraisers
being substantially lower than that of Mr. Cain), it
is excessive.

In making the determination of the value

of property taken, the jury chose to ignore the testimony of all of the expert appraisers.

In so doing,

the jury chose the personal, inexpert, unobjective,
and obviously self-serving testimony of Mr. Sampson,
the landowner, rather than the clear preponderance of
of expert opinion based on market values and experience.
Mr. Sampson testified that the land taken had a value

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of $60,000 (T. 43-48).
Although the total of the verdict is within
the range of expert testimony, the value of property
taken is not. That a verdict in a condemnation can
be improper and is reversible when only a portion
of it exceeds the testimony, is clear from State Road
Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 347
(1968).

In that case, the verdict of the jury on

severance damages exceeded the testimony of any witnes
as to amount of severance damage.

The total of the

verdict for taking and damage, however, was within the
total testimony.

The court held that the verdict

should be reversed because a part of it exceeded any
evidence presented at trial.
In this case, the amount of the verdict for
property taken exceeds all expert evidence in the
record.

It is within the amount testified to by the

landowner himself but that testimony is not substantial enough to support the verdict.

-

.

The general rule is that the owner of
property is permitted to testify at trial of a condemnation case.

It does not necessarily follow,
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however, that because he is allowed to testify, that
the testimony which he gives is sufficient to support
a jury verdict. The court stated the criteria which
should be used to determine when the testimony of the
property owner will support a verdict in excess of
expert appraisal testimony in the case of State Road
Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507 (1970).
In that case the jury awarded to the defendants the
exact amount which had been testified to by the
defendant, Lewis R. Dillree. That amount exceeded
by some $1,600 the amount which was testified to by
the highest of the expert witnesses who were called
at the trial. The case was appealed by the condemnor
who contended that since the verdict exceeded the
expert testimony, it was excessive and should be
reversed.

The court upheld the verdict and said that

the testimony of the property owner was sufficient to
support the verdict in this type of case because the
following conditions were met:

(1) There is no other

evidence except the amount of the verdict which indicates
that the verdict was determined by passion and
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prejudice; (2) The testimony of the landowner is
credible, based upon his qualifications to testify;
and (3)

The owners estimate is reasonable and does

not exceed the expert estimate by more than a small
amount.

25 Utah 2d at 186#
The Dillree criteria are further illuminated

by Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele Ranch, 533
P.2d 888 (Utah 1975).

In the Steele Ranch case,

the court struck down a jury verdict of severance
damages which had no support in the evidence except
the estimate given by Dr. Steele, the owner of the
property being condemned.

Dr. Steele testified that

the ranch property had suffered severance damage in
the amount of $100,000.

In examining this evidence

the court said:
"[There]... is some apprehension as to its soundness...
because it is so greatly in
excess of the values placed,
thereon by the expert witnesses,
who, with their expert knowledge, appear to have made
careful analyses and computations concerning the values,
including the severance
damage. The estimate of
$21,057 by expert Smith for
the Road Commission, was more
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than doubled to $47,791 by
Mr. Harding, the defendant's
expert; and Dr. Steele more
than doubled that again in
reaching his estimate of
$100,000, nearly five times
the estimate of Mr. Smith.
It is appreciated that it
is often stated that an owner
may testify to the value of
his property. We have no
doubt that this is generally
a safe and proper rule. But
it is also true that when
general rules are applied to
specific circumstances
difficulties are ofttimes
encountered. It takes but .
brief reflection to realize
that a person may come into
ownership of property by inheritance, or otherwise, who
may not have any realistic
idea of its value. If it
should so appear, the evidence
would have no probative use
and should be deemed incompetent; and this may be true
in varying degrees, with a
corresponding effect upon its
credibility. In our case it
does appear that Dr. Steele
had had considerable experience
in dealings in property. Nevertheless, there is the important
factor somewhat related to
the above, that his estimate
of severance damages, especially
when it involved property
owned by him, including his own
home, may well have been suffused with a high degree of selfinterest." 533 P.2d 888.
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In Steele Ranch, the court makes no mention
of evidence of passion and prejudice other than the
excessive verdict.

Despite the owner's past dealings

in property, the court found that his estimate was so
far in excess of the estimate of the experts as to
indicate that the evidence was influenced by a high
degress of self-interest.

Even applying the Dillree

criteria, it appears that the most important consideration looked at by the court was the excessiveness of :
the verdict.

.,

...._.. .

If the Dillree standards concerning the
sufficiency of a landowner's testimony to support a
verdict are applied to this case, it is evident that
the verdict cannot stand.

The first of the Dillree

criteria appears to be met here. There is no evidence
that the verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice except the amount of the verdict. As noted
above, however, this excessiveness is an extremely
important consideration in determining whether the
verdict is proper.

In the Silliman case, Supra, there

was likewise no evidence of passion or prejudice except
the excessiveness of the verdict. The court, neverthe-
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less, looked on that as an important consideration in
determining whether the verdict was proper and ordered
a new trial.
The second and third of the Dillree criteria
are not met in this case. The testimony of Mr* Sampson
concerning the land value is without any sufficient
support or basis.

On direct examination, Mr. Sampson

admitted that he had not had any real estate dealings
in the county other than purchase of the subject
property (T.42).

He had been in operation at the same

location since 1958 (T. 40) and so had neither bought
nor sold any real property in the area for at least
sixteen years at the date of taking. At one point,
Mr. Sampson also said that he had not had occasion to
"observe and inquire into the sales of other property
in the area" (T. 43), although other parts of the
record indicate that he had made some such inquiries.
On cross-examination regarding the sales
which Mr. Sampson used to arrive at his estimate of
land value, he said that the sales were of small
lots, that he could not recall how large they were,
not what the selling price was (T. 52-53).
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He only

said that he figured it would come to about $5,000
per acre.

No support for his calculations was offered

by the defendant.
The fact that Mr. Sampson had been in the
dairy business for a great number of years may have
qualified him as an expert concerning the operation
of a dairy, the cost of such an operation, the value
. —OXf.

of and replacement cost of the milking parlor and other
improvements, and the ability to carry on the operation
at the subject property in its condition after the
taking.

It does not, however, qualify him as an

expert on the value of real property.

By his own

admission he had not had any dealings in real property.
The only basis which he could offer for his estimate
of $5,000 per acre was some general inquiries and some
lot sales for which he did not know either the size
nor price.

That was the entire extent of his qualifica-

tions to testify as to land value.
Mr. Sampson's testimony likewise fails to
meet the last of the Dillree standards. The testimony
of Mr. Sampson was more than just a small amount over
the estimates of the expert witnesses. Mr. Sampson
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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placed a value on the land taken of $5,000 per acre.
This was double the appraisal of Mr. Cain, his own
witness, who arrived at a value of $2,500 per acre for
the property taken (T. 89-90).

The experts called by

the State testified to a value at or below that testified to by Mr. Cain. Mr. Sampson's testimony of the
value of the improvements is likewise greatly in
excess of the experts' estimates.

In total, the

testimony of the landowner concerning the amount of
compensation he should receive is nearly $19,000
above that of the highest expert and nearly $40,000
above that of the highest expert called by the State,
Some other jurisdictions have also recognized
that although a landowner is permitted to testify,
his testimony may not be sufficient to support the
verdict.

In the case of State v. Barnes, 443 P.2d 16

(Mont. 1968), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a
lower court and held that a new trial was proper
when the jury returned a land value above the expert's
opinion, even though the total award of $44,379 was
well under the highest total testimony of $92,000 by
Mr. Barnes, the landowner.

The court said:
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"It is a fundamental and
well established rule of law
that the burden of proof as
to the amount of damages in
condemnation proceedings is
upon the property owner. Here,
by expert testimony, the highest figure for the land and
improvements taken was
$9,856 and the trial court
erred in denying a motion for
new trial when the jury failed
to find in this or a lesser
amount." State v. Barnes,
443 P.2d 16 (Mont. 1968).

.ia

The same reasoning which was used by the Montana court
in Barnes is also applicable to this case. The logic
of Justice Henriod in his concurring opinion in the
Dillree case is instructive here.

In discussing the

court's affirmance of the verdict in that case which
was in excess of the defendant's top expert witness's
figure, Justice Henriod said:

'

v

"He called his witness and
should accept his figure,
since his evidence is no
stronger than his strongest
link, much less its weakest,
and his own testimony, obviously self-serving...should be
restricted to the test of his
own chosen expert witnesses
based on market, not opinion
value." 25 Utah 2d at 186.
In summary, it appears that there is no

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

substantial evidence to support the jury verdict
concerning value of property taken. The testimony
of Mr. Sampson is not sufficient because he is not an
expert on the subject. The mere fact that he is the
owner of the property is not enough.

The standards

of the Dillree case were not met in that the testimony
had no substantial basis in fact and it was more than
a small amount above the estimate of the experts who
testified in the case. Mr. Sampson's testimony as
to land value was, in fact, double that of the highest
expert.

For these reasons, the verdict lacks the

necessary support in the evidence and must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

HAROLD D.
Assistant
115 State
Salt Lake

MITCHELL
Attorney General
Capitol
City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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